Israel Pinedo Barron

It was April 1933, on a weekend in Seattle. Outside Fort Vancouver National Military Park, thousands of Americans, Chinese and indigenous people all crowded to watch a military parade called the "Oahu Regatta." But this time, it was Canada's first parade for many of its future fighter planes, including its Royal Canadian Air Force (Cd) squadron, No. 402, which had just been authorized to enter the U.S. army with their crews.

While touring American bases around Hawaii, commander Cmdr. Bernard Roberts ordered his pilots home after finding that men were being fired upon simply for getting up at dawn. While these "shootdown" incidents are routinely mentioned by air war reporters, few people have questioned whether the training that preceded the advent of sound gunnery made Canadians aware of how quickly enemy machine guns could be placed into position and engaged. In fact, it is estimated that in mid-1929, Canadian warplanes entered combat three times more quickly than American ones because the English language demanded it. It seemed logical, considering the American gunslingers' inadequate training, that an interpreter would be provided during shooting practice exercises.

But when Roberts arrived at training base B-29 Elnora, in central Ontario, he was confronted by his pilots who refused to speak English, claiming that they were Americans and threatened not to return to the States. Two hours later, over lunch, one of Roberts' aircraft brought back a 7th Wing communications officer who translated the scene before the Canadian air crew's interpreter was then summoned. Although the flight surgeon recalled that some Cd pilots argued about the situation, the new dispatch officer immediately concluded that the pilots knew the reason why they were landing at B-29 Elnora. These Americans, he noted, were never supposed to land there — contrary to the Cd's training and common sense.

According to former AAF commander General Smedley Butler, the whole incident strongly impressed him. As early as March 1932, when the Cd's headquarters had interviewed Roberts and his Cd pilots, the general was struck by their "absurdity." The fact that these American officers believed that they were invading Canada via flight training points to a much greater extent than the Cd was "almost unbelievable," he wrote. He concluded that the "abominable spirit" that he observed among Cd pilots motivated the problem.