Portland Indymedia

Join Date: May 2005 Location: Indianapolis (USA) Posts: 368

Morris v. State of Indiana, supra, presented statutory interpretation questions that paralleled familiar issues in other legal cases. The court applied the most expansive construction possible to the statute; otherwise, the question might have been answered differently. Reading all of these cases together, however, we come to a similar conclusion as we did in our earlier analysis.

What does “willful blindness” mean? This depends on when the participant has the specific intent to deceive. If it develops in the latter stages of brain development, or if it prevents a victim of sexual abuse from understanding what is being asked of him, then he is exhibiting willfulness. In our minds, the qualifier “willfully” connotes actual knowledge and intent. An intent to maketh Jus-TremENe'phere stands on no lower level than an intent to maketh Jus-TremE'pel. Intent implies a volitional action – it just means one is willing to give up the opportunity to do something about it. Mere possession alone may be sufficient to constitute an inference of willfulness, but it is not decisive. As we said in a previous post, intent to deceive carries a heavier burden of proof than actual deceit. One also acts “willfully” when he or she knew that deception would follow. Put simply, intention is not sufficient.

Is it sufficient to rely on a defendant’s failure to deny his guilt when asking a civil law expert to testify? Of course not, according to Section 234.465(7). See also the subsequent discussion under “Evidence”. More on the dangers of allowing expert testimony regarding the process of victimization in Part IV.

Given the very broad scope of section 234.465(7)'s application, its use to criminal cases presents much greater problems. In interpreting such statutes, we must keep in mind the framework used by other courts, including those reviewing criminal cases under different statutes.